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ABSTRACT
Identifying a successful mutual fund investment involves a crucial analysis of alternatives, all
of which influence the true benefit of the investment. Major considerations must include
performance, management and fees; which ultimately determine investment returns. Studies
have shown that team managed mutual funds exhibit similar risk adjusted performance to
individually managed mutual funds, however studies lack this comparison of performance
based on fund fees and investment objective. This gap in research implies that there is an
opportunity to examine how fund management, investment objective, and fund fees affect
overall returns to the investor. Using the 2010 Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database, this study provides an examination of team managed and individually managed
mutual funds with given investment styles on the basis of fees and overall returns. This study
finds empirical evidence that team management has a significant negative effect on equity
objective mutual funds, while having a positive impact on Debt and Equity combination
funds. In addition, our research concludes that team management has no significant effect on
funds whose primary focus is debt. Across the majority of fund objectives, the added benefit
of team management in the mutual fund industry continues to be outweighed by the increased
cost of a team managed operating structure.
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INTRODUCTION
The mutual fund industry has increasingly become an instrument for investors, both
knowledgeable and new to the industry, to generate desired returns based on a given amount
of risk. A large variety of mutual funds are offered, ones which cater to the diverse needs of
the worlds investors. Mutual funds for higher risk, speculative strategies can be found, as
well as funds which play very conservatively and look to achieve lower, more stable returns.
The United States is a major hub for mutual fund investment, and as can be seen in Figure 1
below, holds 48% of worldwide mutual fund assets. Within this slice of mutual fund assets
totaling $11.1 trillion, 33% or $3.6 trillion is invested in domestic equity funds, and 11% or
$1.2 trillion is invested international equity funds. Relating to other fund types investigated in
this study, bond funds total 20% or $2.2 trillion while hybrid funds account for $666 billion.
Thus, this study attempts to analyze fund types which comprise over 70% of mutual fund
assets. With such a large amount of assets at work, and many investors relying and betting on
the returns of these funds, it is important to understand if one type of fund may have an
advantage over another.

Figure 1: Worldwide Mutual Fund Market – Percentage of Total Net Assets 2009 (2010
Investment Company Fact Book)
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Due to the recent economic turmoil, investors risk aversion has increased, meaning investors
are now willing to take less risk in the mutual fund and equity markets than in previous
decades.

Figure 2: Net Flows to Mutual Funds 1995-2009 (Billions) (2010 Investment Company Fact
Book)
This trend has caused net flows to mutual funds to decrease by $150B in 2009, as can be seen
in Figure 2, signifying investor’s uncertainty in the markets (2010 Investment Company Fact
Book, 2010).
More specific to this study, which focuses on mutual fund objective type, investors have
continued to withdraw cash from mutual funds. As seen in Figure 3 below, withdrawals
totaled $9B in 2009 but were still much less than the $234B withdrawn due to the market
turmoil of 2008. This is mainly due to the correlation between equity inflows and stock
market performance (2010 Investment Company Fact Book, 2010).

-4-

Investment Styles, Fees, & Abnormal Returns Among Individually Managed & Team
Managed Mutual Funds
Senior Capstone Project for Kendal Cehanowicz

Figure 3: Net Flows to Equity Funds Related to Global Stock Price Performance 1995-2009
(2010 Investment Company Fact Book)
Age is another key factor in gauging the risk tolerance of investors. The United States is
home to an aging population, and as they get older, they are willing to take on less risk.
Typically in one’s life cycle, a younger investor will take on more risk due to expected
revenue from work over the rest of their life. An older investor, perhaps nearing retirement,
will look for fixed income opportunities with little risk to ensure they are able to maintain
their standard of living. Figure 4 below depicts the changes in willingness to take substantial
investment risk over time by percentage of households. Shown below, individuals ages 50
and older are willing to take significantly less risk in their investments than the younger
generations. For example, in 2009 only 8% of households 65 or older were willing to take on
above average investment risk, while 26% of households 35 to 49 were willing to take on
excess risk. Thus the aging of the population may play an important fact in the demand for
certain types of mutual funds in the future. This fact has important implications to this study,
as team managed funds may offer the potential for less risk to the investor.
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Figure 4: Willingness to Take above Average Risk or Substantial Investment Risk by Age
(Percentage of Households) (2010 Investment Company Fact Book)
These trends of increasing investor risk aversion lead the question of what type of fund best
serves investors given today’s market characteristics. A given investor looks to maximize
return for a given amount of risk, and as this study will examine, may be able to obtain greater
return from funds whose decisions are made by a team of managers, rather than a single
person. These funds that are team managed also tend to exhibit lower risk structures, offering
stronger decisions to the investor for less risk. This argument will be discussed further later in
the study, and was made prevalent by Blinder and Morgan (2005). In addition, fund fees have
become a crucial selling point for mutual funds, and must be taken into account when
calculating and analyzing investor returns.
A more recent trend in academia has been the analysis of many different characteristics that
may be used to predict or affect fund performance. Examples include fund size, manager
attributes, and price history of the fund. Chevalier & Ellison (1999) examine such details as
the fund manager’s age, tenure, required SAT scores of their undergraduate institution, and
their MBA status to predict fund performance. Chevalier & Ellison (1999) believe strong
management characteristics lead to strong investment performance, but suggest an untapped
area of study based on management team size.
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Middleton & Prather (2002) argue that team size, and in essence decision making, are based
on two main theories. The first theory is called classical utility theory, and the second is
called behavioral decision making theory. In classical utility theory, Arrow (1987) would
argue that differing alternative approaches to the same problem should lead to the same
maximizing choice and optimal outcome. He argues that this is the case whether the decision
is made by an individual, group, or organization. Thus, Arrow (1987) argues individual and
group decision makers should not vary in their performance.
On the other hand, the behavioral decision making theory as argued by Vollrath et al. (1989)
asserts that when a given task is complex and completed under above average levels of
uncertainty, group members pool their resources. Group members tend to integrate their
knowledge and correct errors, thus producing superior performance and decision making
compared to individuals. One aspect of research this study lacks however is the effect of team
management on costs. It may be true that teams make superior decisions, however it is
necessary to examine if those decisions lead to returns which outweigh the increased costs of
team management. The rationale behind these studies and theories is clear; it is very
important to understand the relationship between a manager’s decisions and investment
performance, as investor’s risk and return are based on their decisions.
This study attempts to quantify the effects of management structure on fund returns, and
identify on a risk adjusted basis where an investor is better off putting their money. As
previously mentioned, investors risk profiles, willingness to invest, and overall feelings
towards the markets are constantly changing. If there is an opportunity for an investor to have
more certainty on a given investment decision, cash flows will flock there. This study aims to
expand upon recent research, specifically Bliss et al. (2008) and Droms (2006) which still
leave the management team size/structure question unexplained. According to Droms (2006)
54 million U.S. homes own mutual funds, of which 71% seek and rely on professional
investment advice. This means that the majority of households investing in mutual funds are
quite uninformed investors. In addition, for the majority of mutual funds, alpha is not
statistically different from zero, meaning investors will benefit by either reducing costs or
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obtaining more pre-investment information. If an investor can successfully learn new
information or seek out lower cost funds they may be able to generate higher returns. By
examining the hypothesis that team managed mutual funds do in fact provide higher risk
adjusted returns than individually managed mutual funds, this study attempts to provide
further evidence for how investors can make an informed investment decision.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Mutual fund management and performance has become a hot topic in recent research, as more
and more individuals wonder where their money will be best invested. In the case of a typical
investor, the most profitable destination for their funds will be dependent upon the style of
fund they invest in, the manager’s capabilities and decision making, his or her education level,
the fees charged by the fund, some luck, and finally the amount of available investment
information. Recent research has focused on many of these characteristics separately,
attempting to quantify the effect each has on fund returns. Even more recently, studies such
as Bliss et al (2008) have attempted to combine many of these effects in order to analyze the
combined impact of such factors. This study looks to combine these factors in order to
examine a new scenario, connecting fund fees, fund style, and fund performance in relation to
individual and team management. The results of this study will attempt to demonstrate where
an investor will be better off investing their money in regards to management structure and
fees. It is first necessary, however, to understand the accumulation of studies leading to this
point.
According to Sharpe (1991) two main assumptions can be made about mutual funds. The first
is that before costs, the return on the average actively managed dollar will equal the return on
the average passively managed dollar. Second, after costs, the return on the average actively
managed dollar will be less than the return on the average passively managed dollar. Sharpe
(1991) is arguing in this study that actively managed mutual funds do not benefit the investor,
on average. He recommends a practice that is used prominently in the industry today, the
process of benchmarking a defined, specific index in order to measure investment success.
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One effect that this study fails to quantify is if a different type of management structure in
actively managed funds will reduce this negative impact of costs and increase returns.
When comparing mutual fund management and performance, the question of predictability
and sustained performance comes into play. Pozen (2002) defines mutual fund persistence as
the idea that funds which have performed well continue to perform well. In addition, funds
that do not perform well continue to underperform, regardless of manager change.

To re-

enforce this, Grinblatt (1993) studied mutual fund performance to find that over a given
period, a fund that performed well in the first half of the period continued to perform well in
the second half. On the other hand, funds that struggled and lagged in the first period tended
to continue this effort in the second period. Although there are clearly exceptions in the
mutual fund industry, Grinblatt’s (1993) study does show there is a notion of predictability for
mutual fund returns. Pozen (2002) also reflects that many times investors will hold onto poor
performing funds due to cognitive dissonance, meaning investors keep revising their
expectations to hope the fund will rebound. In addition, he mentions that over-performing
funds do not charge higher fees than others, and thus cash flows run to these funds, which
help create future positive performance.
Managers play a key role in the performance of the funds they oversee. After all, they are
human, and thus are subject to varying emotions, irrational decision making, and different
levels of risk tolerance. There are however characteristics of managers which help impact
returns in a positive way. If an investor is able to predict or identify these characteristics in a
fund manager, he or she may be able to increase their probability of abnormal returns.
According to Golec (1996) investors can expect stronger risk-adjusted performance from a
manager who is younger (less than 46yrs.) and has an MBA with long tenure at his/her fund
(greater than 7 years). In this study, Golec (1996) also finds that well diversified low fee
funds to perform better, perhaps supporting a more passive management style. In regards to
returns, Golec (1996) argues that large management fees do not imply poorer performance;
rather they often imply superior management skill and better returns. Very often as managers
improve their track record and become more well-known and talented, they call for a larger
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management fee or will leave the fund. He also mentions that controlling for fund type is
very important in this type of study, citing its significant effect on the endogenous variables
used. Areas for future study and extensions may include the combination effect of multiple
managers in a single fund, as well as complementary characteristics they may bring to the
table.
In a related study conducted three years later in 1999, Chevalier and Ellison (1999)
investigate the relationship between fund performance, the manager’s age, average SAT
score, and MBA status. This study finds that those who have attended schools that require
higher average SAT scores have higher risk-adjusted returns. This makes logical sense as a
manager who is typically more intelligent will perform better, even if sometimes it is due to
higher risk exposure. What this means is that some managers may in fact have superior raw
talent than others, and can better predict and time the markets than their fellow portfolio
managers. Again however, Chavalier and Ellison (1999) neglect to analyze the increased
costs of such managers and subsequent fee adjusted returns. Chevalier and Ellison (1999)
also reinforce the Golec (1996) study by finding that managers with MBA’s outperform those
without by 63 basis points per year. Moving further in this analysis, they discover that this
difference is entirely due to MBA managers having more systematic risk. This may be a
combination of more confidence in gray-area investment decisions as well as a better
understanding of the business cycle.
Fund style is an additional method for determining the investment prospects of a given mutual
fund. Specific fund styles may prove better able to cope with macroeconomic shifts, or
benefit from changes in consumer attitudes, while others may suffer or lag. Goetzmann
(1996) examines equity funds ranging from aggressive growth to income funds.
Traditionally, funds typically fall under many pre-determined umbrellas for style such as
“small-cap” or “growth.” However, Goetzmann (1996) finds that many active funds have
moved to much different styles, reflecting the influence of their managers rather than typical
fund objectives. These funds fall into many new categories such as “trend-chasers” and
“glamour managers.” This point re-enforces the ideals that in the end, all managers are
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human, and subject sometimes to questionable or irrational decision making. For all mutual
funds, the investment policy statement outlines the funds objectives, however over time, as
Goetzmann (1996) indicates, managers may move away from this. Such drives of managers
to grow their fund and prestige to new heights may put investors at risk. Perhaps however,
funds that stray towards new categories and lose focus could be curbed through team
management, with more people monitoring fund focus and positioning.
Daniel et al. (1997) contends that investors who focus on more mature, established large
funds will see a more reasonable fee structure, due to economies of scale for expenses,
management fees, and trading costs. By doing so Daniel et al. (1997) argues the fund will be
able to maintain a stable beta, keep return variance low, and ensure its survival. Based on
their research, Daniel et al (1997) concluded that the amount by which the average mutual
fund beats a mechanical strategy is under 100 basis points. This tends to be approximately the
management fee. Based on this information, the best funds are those that have managers who
change their investment style over time based on new market conditions and trends. If this
zero-sum relationship between the fund’s alpha and management fees exists, managers must
attempt to do one of two things. The first option would be to lower fees, which is unlikely.
The second is to increase returns, and based on the increased potential of group decision
making, and two heads being superior to one, this is highly plausible. However, on the other
side of the coin one must consider the potential for performance erosion due to added
expenses and “decision making overhead” from a team of portfolio managers.
Moving towards a focus on the differentiation between an individually managed mutual fund
and a team managed fund, Prather and Middleton (2000) examine managerial structure of
mutual funds based on two main contrasting theories for decision making:
1. Classical Utility Theory – Differing alternatives to the same problem should lead
to the same maximizing choice and optimal performance outcome, whether the
decision is made by an individual, group, or organization. This theory implies that
individual and group decision makers would not vary in their performance
outcomes.
2. Behavioral Decision Making Theory – When a given task is complex and
completed under high levels of uncertainty, group members tend to pool and
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integrate their resources. This leads to the correction of each other’s errors, while
producing superior performance compared to that of an individual.
Prather and Middleton (2000) maintain that there is no significant difference between the
outcomes of team-managed and individually managed mutual funds. They do not doubt that
teams make superior decisions, however believe these decisions require higher costs, which
limit performance. This question of higher costs to limit performance will be quantified in
this study. In addition, Prather et al. (2004) considers a 25 variable model to analyze the
effect of fund factors on fund performance and agree that management structure does not have
a major effect on fund performance. In addition, he provides that the more focused the
portfolio manager (i.e. not involved in multiple funds), the more successful the fund will be.
In this study, Prather et al. (2004) finds that management variables are not related to excess
returns; rather most excess performance is determined based on the objective of the specific
fund. There has been consistent debate over such topics in academic literature, as years of
research have not yet found a consistent answer.
Karceski (2002) contends that portfolio manager’s actions in bull and bear markets may
influence the cash flows into and out of mutual funds. During bull markets, some managers
will tilt their holdings towards high-beta stocks, thus offering more upside potential. This
action will provide the fund with the greatest benefit should the market continue to rise.
Because of this strong performance if there is in fact a bull market, investors risk aversion will
fall as they commit more and more money to mutual funds, creating a retail client effect. In a
bear market managers may be more inclined to focus their funds on safer, low beta stocks
with high dividend payments, thus increasing the confidence that low risk returns will be
created. During these times, cash flows to funds will slow down or even be negative, as
investors seek preservation of their capital. Typically Karceski (2002) mentions the average
mutual fund has a market beta of 1.05.
One final note crucial to the mutual fund industry, and studies about it, is the presence of
survivorship bias in research. Because of its implications for skewing results, it is important
to explicitly monitor in this study. Carhart et al. (2002) examines mutual fund survivorship,
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concluding that the average bias for samples longer than 15 years is over 1%. In addition,
they find that fund performance does tend to be truly consistent, and is unrelated to fund size
and turnover. This study addresses the issue of survivorship by including both live and dead
funds over the specified time period, thus not limiting results to only those funds which are
still alive today. In order to address this, this study focused only on funds in recent years
from 1995-2010.
The analysis of returns of mutual funds and how they may be affected by management style
and strategy is a question at the forefront of mutual fund analysis. Lynch and Musto (2003)
argue that funds only change strategy after poor performance, which is a logical explanation.
They continue to assert that this means that funds with strategy changes will have dollar flow
and performance that are less sensitive to past performance. The idea here is that funds that
perform well will tend to ride it out and not change, and thus their performance can be better
predicted. Those funds that hire new personnel and implement new techniques will be much
more difficult to predict. These results are also consistent with the study of Chevalier and
Ellison (1999), which maintains poor performer’s that change managers suffer less cash
outflow than those that keep the same manager.
Another factor taken into account in this study is fund size. Chen et al. (2004) focuses on
diversified U.S. equity mutual funds. They conclude that fund size does in fact erode
performance, both before and after fees and expenses. In addition, Chen et al. (2004) finds
that the effect of fund size on returns is most pronounced for funds that invest heavily in small
cap stocks, which suggests liquidity is an important reason that fund size erodes performance.
When managing a growing portfolio of funds, it will reach a point where a single manager can
no longer be fully capable of managing such an excess of funds, and it thus may run less
efficiently.
Blinder and Morgan (2005) begin looking into the performance and decision making speed of
funds managed by teams versus those managed by individuals. Based on their study, they
contend that groups are not slower than individuals in decision making. They also find that
group decisions, are on average better than individual decisions, whether made in unanimity
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or majority rule. Blinder and Morgan (2005) would argue that because of this superior
decision making by groups with no additional information, more heads are better than one,
and recommend the use of committees for important decisions. The Blinder and Morgan
(2005) findings have direct implications for this study, as they establish that teams on average
make better decisions than individuals. In an industry such as mutual funds, where success
and survival is based largely on manager decisions, this becomes crucial. The next question
which this study attempts to analyze is how these decisions are reflected in higher costs, and
how they will affect the investor’s final returns.
Performance manipulation is also a very important mutual fund tactic which an informed
investor must be cautious of when making an investment. It is possible, as Welch et al.
(2007) shows for mutual fund managers to implement tactics and make trades in an effort to
boost certain performance metrics and statistics. For example, a rebalancing strategy can
yield a market beating Jensen’s alpha 86% of the time, even when transaction costs are
unrealistically high! By understanding that managers may be able to actively make
adjustments to favorably affect their funds statistics, investors must be very informed of the
mutual funds strategy compared to other funds of the same type.
Bliss et al. (2008) examines the comparison between individually managed and team managed
mutual funds on the basis of risk. In this study, they find that team managed mutual funds
have significantly lower risk than individually managed mutual funds, attributable to better
team decision making. Contrary to common belief, Bliss et al (2008) concludes that team
managed funds actually have lower expenses and loads than those of individually managed
funds. These fees can be lower by up to fifty basis points per year. This may also be
attributable to the sharing of costs and expenses between a family of funds, which may often
be team managed. The Bliss (2008) study, like this study, controls for size, turnover,
expenses and team management, yet implies that further research may be necessary regarding
the specific team decision making process. In addition, future research may benefit from
excluding family funds (where team management expenses can be shared) and examining the
effect of team management on these independent funds. If family funds where expenses are
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low are excluded, it may be that team managed funds actually provides expenses greater than
the benefits they create, causing returns to suffer. Our study attempts to expand the Bliss et
al. (2008) analysis, applying these metrics to analyze overall fund returns both before and
after accounting for fees.
Continuing on the important topic of risk, Massa and Patgiri (2009) observe the relationship
of incentives to mutual fund performance, and how these affect risk taken. This study finds
that high-incentive managerial contracts induce managers to take more risk and reduce the
funds probability of survival. In return for this, surviving funds with high incentives do
typically deliver persistent higher risk adjusted returns. On average, the top 20% of highincentive funds outperform the bottom 20% by 2.70% per year. Massa and Patgiri (2009) find
that an increase of 1% in incentives typically leads to a nearly 1% increase in the annual
volatility of monthly fund returns. In terms of survival of a fund, a 1% increase in incentives
leads to a reduction in survival probability of 2%.
Thus based on the previous research done in this specific area, and this study’s attempt to
expand upon gaps identified in this research, we expect that team managed mutual funds
provide a greater risk adjusted return than individually managed mutual funds of the same
objective type. In addition, we expect the benefit of team management to be most profound
for actively managed equity mutual funds. When examining debt funds, we expect team
management to have an insignificant if not negative impact on fund returns, as team
management in this objective type is not as prevalent in the industry. Using these hypotheses,
this study provides an empirical study relating a comparison in performance of team and
individually managed mutual funds based on fund size, turnover, expenses and other
explanatory variables.

DATA & EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
The source of the equity mutual fund data used in this study, including performance
information as well as fund characteristics (such as fees, management structure, and first offer
dates) were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database from
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1995-2010. The CRSP database provides quarterly updates of managers, turnover, and
expense ratios, as well as other data categories. Within this time period, this study considers
14,334 unique mutual funds based on the following restrictions. The study’s sample includes
both live and dead funds with total net asset values greater than twenty million dollars. In
addition, this study focuses on the distinguishing identifier classifying each fund as
individually managed or team managed. This information was also obtained using the CRSP
database. For use in this study, monthly returns from the CRSP database were compounded
to quarterly figures to ensure the observations matched. For the sake of having the most
unbiased sample, this study applies standard regressions across multiple fund types, including
general domestic equity, municipal bond funds, commodity funds, etc. In addition, our
sample ranges from 1995 – 2010. This starting date for our data sample reflects our desire for
consistency, as the reporting processes for CRSP data switched at the end of 1994 from
Wiesenberger objectives to Lipper Classifications. By including both currently live fund
observations as well as those funds which are currently dead but were at one point active this
study eliminates survivorship bias.
Computation of Returns
Based on the documentation for the Center for Research in Securities Prices, returns for each
mutual fund are reported on a monthly basis. In order to ensure that all the variables used in
this study were on an apples-to-apples basis, these returns had to be changed to quarterly.
This adjustment was done by compounding the returns of the three months which
corresponded with a given quarter. For example, the observation returns for January,
February, and March were compounded to yield the quarter 1 return.
Data Organization
Based on this study’s restrictions and boundaries, it became necessary to ensure all data
observations could be identified uniquely, and all information merged correctly to be on a
quarterly basis. In order to do this, this study applies a series of filters to the CRSP data to
place the data into quarterly buckets. Specifically, data for fees and/or fund style are placed
into a quarterly bucket (1, 2, 3, and 4) and assigned a number to identify them with that
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quarter and year. By doing this, our study allows us to account for the fact that fund fees,
styles, or other characteristics may change over the lifetime of the fund.
Once the data set was compiled, it became necessary to organize the large number of mutual
fund observations based on their fund objective, thus allowing us to see the impact of
management structure across multiple fund types. In order to do this, mutual funds were
assigned to one of seven objective buckets based on their Lipper Objective and Classification
Codes as provided in the CRSP database. The buckets reflect the following objectives:
1. Domestic Equity – Mutual funds whose main focus is investment in 100% equities
of companies within the United States.
2. Non-Domestic Equity – Mutual funds whose main focus is investments in 100%
equities of companies outside of the United States.
3. Debt/Equity Combined Funds – Mutual funds whose portfolio mix consists of a
combination of both equities and debt securities.
4. Government Debt – Mutual funds who invest solely in U.S. government and U.S.
government agency securities.
5. Corporate Debt – Mutual funds whose main investment focus is in debt securities
issued by corporations.
6. Municipal Debt – Mutual funds whose primary investment focus is that of debt
securities issued by a city, other local governments or their agencies.
7. Materials & Commodities – Mutual funds which invest in securities relating to
materials and commodities, such as Gold.
Mutual fund performance is primarily affected by factors such as size, turnover, fees, and
yield; however this study attempts to identify the impact of these characteristics on team
managed versus individually managed mutual funds. In addition, this study attempts to
quantify the impact of fees on overall fund returns for multiple fund objectives. The results of
this study were calculated using a regression analysis based on data in the CRSP database.
The regression equation examines how fund returns (dependent variable) are affected by the
fund being individually managed or team managed (indicator variable) as well as by other
control variables (independent variables). Such other control variables include characteristics
such as fee structure, turnover, yield, total net assets, etc. Following common practice when
conducting mutual fund return studies, the three factors of the Fama-French model are also
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included in the regression and are explained in detail below. The general regression equation
is represented by Eq. 1
Eq. 1: Regression Model
FUNDRET – RISKFREE = β0 + β1MGMTTYPE + β2TOTALFEES+ β3TURNOVER +
β4LOGTNALATEST + β5SMB + β6HML + β7MRP + β8YIELD + ε
Definition of Variables:
Dependent Variable:
1. Fund Returns-Risk Free Rate: Represents the quarterly compounded return for
each fund as listed in the CRSP database on a percentage basis above that of the
risk free rate.
Independent Variables:
2. Management Type: Indicates whether each fund is managed by a single portfolio
manager, or a team of portfolio managers. This variable is crucial as previous
research has found mixed results on the effects of team decision making and
ultimately overall fund fees and returns. By accounting for this variable, this study
adds an additional dimension to research previously done.
3. Total Fees: Represents the Total Fee Cost of a given mutual fund. This is a
cumulative variable combining 12b1 fees (annual marketing and distribution fees),
management fees (charge for active management), and the expense ratio for each
mutual fund. In past studies, fee structure has been a major area of focus. This
study allows this analysis to be expanded, by relating fee structure with
management type.
4. Turnover: Represents the Turnover Ratio for each given mutual fund. This metric
is calculated by dividing the aggregate sales or purchases of securities by the
average 12-month total net assets of the fund. This ratio is expressed as a
percentage of the fund. Turnover ratio is a very important metric to observe and
compare with fees and returns as it may be indicative of the type of manager
running the fund.
5. LOG Total Net Assets: The log of Total Net Assets of each fund is used in this
study not only as a filter for funds over $20MM, but also to examine the
relationship between fund size, performance, and fee structure. A total net assets
variable or other similar size metric is common in research of this type, as fund
size has repeatedly been an area of discussion in finance literature.
6. SMB: Small-Minus-Big is one of the three factors put forth in the Fama-French
three factor model. This variable represents the spread in returns between small
and large sized firms based on their market capitalization. This variable attempts
to account for the difference in performance between large and small companies.
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7. HML: High-Minus-Low is the second of the three factors expressed in the widely
accepted Fama-French model. This variable represents the spread in returns
between value and growth stocks. This metric is also known as the value premium
assesses the outperformance of stocks with value characteristics over those with
growth characteristics.
8. Rm-Rf: Market Risk Premium is the third factor included in the Fama-French
model. This factor is a measure of the price of market risk, the return beyond that
of the risk free rate which investors require in order to bear market risk with their
investments.
9. Yield: Yield represents the ratio of income distributions to net asset value at the
end of a given period. The Yield variable measures a manager’s propensity to
select high-dividend stocks. Because management fees are paid as a percentage of
fund assets, the more the fund pays out the smaller its asset base and management
fees. Managers may choose stocks that disburse large dividends as part of a value
investment style, or to attract specific investors.
Table 1 below depicts these independent variables in chart form for quick reference. For
summary statistics for all variables across all fund objective types, please see Table A2 in
appendix A.
Table 1: Variable Descriptions
Independent Variables
Management Type
Total Fees
Turnover
Total Net Assets
SMB (Small Minus Big)
HML (High Minus Low)
Rm-Rf (Risk Premium)
Yield

Description
Dummy variable indicating individually or team managed
Total fee cost of a given mutual fund
Percentage of mutual fund holdings replaced in a given year
Total net asset value of the mutual fund, reported in millions
Spread in returns between small and large sized firms
Spread in returns between value and growth stocks
Market risk premium
Ratio of income distributions and Net Asset Value

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results of this study’s regression analysis are depicted in table form and can be seen in
Table A3 which can be found in Appendix A. Table A3 provides descriptive statistics for the
seven objective categories of mutual funds examined in this study through regression analysis.
As previously stated, mutual fund observations are separated into seven bucket categories
reflecting fund type. For each of these regressions, a large portion of return behavior was
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captured by the three factor Fama-French model variables SMB, HML, and Rm-Rf (Market
Risk Premium). Previous research has proven these three variables to be crucial metrics in
calculating returns.
Our regression model for Domestic Equity funds, as shown in Table A3 in Appendix A,
yields an R2 value of .8099, indicating that the independent variables do a strong job of
explaining fund returns. Domestic Equity funds focus on investments in equities located
within the borders of the United States. One would expect a larger tendency towards team
management in such funds as they are more likely to be actively managed on a daily basis.
With the various numbers of equities and exchanges constantly trading each day, one would
expect a team to better manage such a fund. In this regression the dummy variable reflecting
individual or team management was significant at the 5% level, yielding a coefficient of 0.00156. Although this impact may be economically minimal, it does yield important
implications that team management may provide added returns, however these returns are
overshadowed by increased management fees. In addition, if this team management
coefficient is annualized, a more significant effect on returns is realized. Although team
management may lead to better decisions, these decisions may be overshadowed by the
increased time and expense. Turnover and Total Net Assets also were significant at the 5%
level for Domestic Equity funds, each of which had positive coefficients of 0.00061 and
0.00052 respectively. These results signify that a fund with higher turnover, typically being
actively managed, will produce higher returns for investors. In addition, these findings
indicate that fund size also has a positive impact on returns of Domestic Equity funds,
although small. These results correspond with previous research findings, following the
theory that costs become more spread out across larger funds. Yield was also significant
statistically and had a large impact on fund returns, with a coefficient of -0.10180. This
impact may be so strong because so many U.S. investors are interested in funds which invest
in stocks with high dividend yields. These stocks however tend to not experience the most
appreciation in value, and investors must pay taxes on dividends. The tax implications of
such a type of fund may contribute to the negative effect yield has on overall returns.
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When examining Non-Domestic Equity Funds, those which focus on equity securities of
companies located outside of the United States, our regression model yields an R2 of .7076.
The management of Non-Domestic funds requires executives to be increasingly aware of
world events at all times of the day, and can prove to be extremely rewarding yet equally
risky. Such funds lend themselves to a team management structure, allowing multiple
individuals to work as a cohesive unit to follow current events and indicators around the
world in order to ultimately make informed investment decisions. What we find however, is
that this team management continues to have an adverse impact on fund returns. Significant
at the 5% level, the Team Management dummy variable yielded a coefficient of -0.00565.
Once again, as found with Domestic Equity funds, the economic impact is minimal but
negative. This brings forth the trend that the value added from a team management structure
may not be enough to counteract increased time and costs of running the fund in such a
manner. An interesting result in the Non-Domestic equity regression is the impact of Total
Fees on fund returns. Total Fees had a positive coefficient of 0.00260, meaning that funds in
this category which charge higher fees tend to have higher returns. These higher fees may be
reflective of superior management as well as active management. If a fund manager is able to
move funds efficiently across markets and make active trades, higher expenses may in fact
prove to be a benefit to investors. This finding is consistent with past studies such as Prather
and Middleton (2002) that also imply high fund fees may sometimes imply above average
management.
We next looked to observe Debt and Equity Combinations funds. Such funds combine debt
securities and equity securities in order to find the ample diversified portfolio mix across asset
classes. Management of this fund structure would also lend itself to team management, as
certain members of the team would ideally be specialists in certain areas. For instance, a
cohesive team which works well together would have members who are aware of their
teammate’s strengths and weaknesses. In this case, some members would ideally specialize in
short term debt investments, while others in growth equity opportunities. The combined
results would preferably be a higher alpha value. Our analysis of these debt/equity combined
funds yielded an R2 value of .6614. Once again, the most notable explanatory variables were
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the Market Risk Premium, HML, and SMB indicators, all of which were significant at the 5%
level. When examining the Team Management output, our results once again depicted a
positive impact on fund returns. Yielding a coefficient of 0.00161, the Team Management
variable indicates that for Debt and Equity combination funds, team management may
actually prove beneficial to the investor. This may be due to the complexities of managing a
fund across multiple asset classes. Another interesting finding is that for debt and equity
combinations funds, it appears that fund size actually does erode fund performance. Our
research shows that the larger the total net asset base for these types of funds, the more returns
are adversely affected. The Total Net Assets variable yields a coefficient of -0.00008, which
may be because these funds can become so large that they become hard to manage. As the
fund grows larger it ultimately grows in complexity, which can lead to inefficiencies and
ultimately hurt returns. These conclusions are consistent with the findings regarding fund size
and erosion of returns as reported by Chen et al. (2004).
The next three fund types are reflective of mutual funds which solely focus on certain types of
debt, specifically Government Debt, Corporate Debt, and Municipal debt. As mentioned
earlier, Government Debt funds are those which invest only in U.S. government and U.S.
government agency securities. Corporate Debt funds are those which invest in the debt
securities issued by corporations, and Municipal Debt funds focus on debt securities issued by
cities, local agencies, and other local governments. These are the types of funds which
investors flock to who are looking for safe, constant returns. As opposed to an objective
equity fund, such as aggressive growth which seeks a large amount of capital gains, these
funds provide liquidity and peace of mind for investors seeking constant returns and capital
preservation. For these three fund types, team management was not expected, as the “active”
element of managing such funds is quite different from that of an equity fund. The
management of these types of funds correlates best with a single fund manager and our
findings support this. For Government Debt funds, the Team Management variable resulted
in a coefficient of -0.00066, while Corporate Debt funds and Municipal Debt funds provided
coefficients of -0.00223 and -0.00098 respectively. Each of these results corresponded with
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our initial expectations, that in specialized debt funds team management does not provide any
added value in terms of returns to the typical investor.
Lastly we analyzed Material & Commodity funds in order to gauge the effect of team
management on a unique asset class that is hotly debated in current news. The regression run
on these types of funds resulted in an R2 of .447, indicating that the independent variables did
a strong job of explaining the variation in returns. We found again for Material &
Commodity funds that team management has a harmful effect on the mutual fund returns, as
the coefficient value was -0.03642. This highly significant value may attest to the volatility
and difficulty of timing commodities prices, whereas a buy and hold strategy may be more
lucrative. Some interesting results however surfaced regarding the Total Fees variable.
Significant at the 5% level, the Total Fees variable displayed a coefficient of 0.05552,
indicating that for Material and Commodity funds, higher returns may be partially expected
from those funds with higher fees. These fees may be reflective of both superior and
intelligent active management. The magnitude of this impact of fees on returns is very large,
and proves to be a significant finding.
It is important however, in any study, to account for any bias or uncertainty in the data and
regressions used to form a conclusion. A fundamental tool to begin such an analysis involves
examining the correlations between variables used in the regressions. If correlations exist
which are too high, specifically above the threshold of .7 in this study, it may indicate that the
information present in one variable is being covered by another already in the model. When
examining the correlation coefficients of the regression models, we found only one area for
concern. In each of the seven regressions the correlation between MGMTFEE and
TOTALFEES was measured as above .9. The implication of these results is that the impact of
fees is being reflected in both variables, even though both are separate and non-inclusive.
Looking forward, it may be plausible to further separate these fee variables and examine the
new regression results.
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CONCLUSION
Over the past two decades, the growth in team-managed mutual funds has far outpaced the
growth of individually managed mutual funds. This is due to the increasing belief in the
effectiveness of team decision making; specifically the idea that diverse teams produce better
results with lower risk than an individual. In addition, the idea of economization of
management expenses across fund families has also induced many mutual funds to implement
the team management structure. By sharing expenses across a larger number of funds, funds
can potentially attract investors to a team managed fund without eroding performance. In
terms of investments and fund management, many believe that a team can better analyze
risks, comprehend multiple perspectives, and blend strategy to make a safe and effective
decision. However, when looking at the history of top funds and fund managers, they are
nearly always individuals. Managers like Peter Lynch and John Neff have become almost
superhuman icons in the investment world, and prove that certain people can beat the markets.
This study finds that although teams may be able to comprehend multiple complex
perspectives and strategies as well as large amounts of information, the added value they
provide measured by returns does not outweigh the increased cost of team management for
most funds. For specific fund types which lend themselves to team management, such as
Domestic Equity and Non-Domestic Equity funds, where vast amounts of information and
strategies need to be implemented, our empirical evidence shows teams add more expense
than value to investor returns. For Debt and Equity combination funds however, we do find
that team management may have a small, yet significant impact on fund returns postexpenses. This is likely due to the high complexity of such funds, where it proves to be
beneficial to have both a debt and equity specialist manager. In addition, this study finds that
higher fund fees should not necessarily deter investors from choosing a given fund, as we find
that higher fee structures in many instances are correlated with higher returns for the investor.
Avenues for future study include further examining the fee relationship between funds that are
independent and those that are part of fund families. The relationship between whether or not
a fund is a member of a family and the funds expenses may lead to more specific indications
of the success or failure of team management.
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APPENDIX A
Table A1: Detailed Variable Descriptions
The following table provides a more detailed description of the independent variables used in this study.

Indep. Var.
Management Type
Total Fees
Turnover
Total Net Assets
Small Minus Big
High Minus Low
Risk Premium
Yield

Description
Dummy variable indicating individually or team managed fund
Total fee cost of a given mutual fund (Inclusive of expense ratio and 12b1)
Percentage of mutual fund holdings that have been replaced in a given year
Total net asset value of the mutual fund, reported in millions
Spread in returns between small and large sized firms, based on market capitalization
Spread in returns between value and growth stocks, also known as the value premium
Market risk factor: Return over the risk free rate investors require to bear market risk
Ratio of income distributions and Net Asset Value at the end of a given period
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Table A2: Summary Statistics by Fund Type
The following table depicts summary statistics for each separate regression run in this study. Standard statistical measures
run across the top row, while the first column offers identification for each variable. To read this table, simply look up the
Asset Class/Fund Type in Column 1, and examine the associated statistics with each variable.

Independent Variables

Obs.

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min.

Max.

Domestic Equity
Returns (Dependent)

90892

0.0153

0.1058

-0.6245

1.2635

Management Type

0.3851

0.4866

0.0000

1.0000

Total Fees

0.6091

0.9240

-117.4069

4.0568

Turnover

0.8701

1.2475

0.0000

85.2800

Log(Total Net Assets)

4.7952

1.2945

2.9957

10.7619

Yield

0.0025

0.0079

0.0000

0.5739

0.0242

0.1153

-0.7061

0.9536

Management Type

0.4529

0.4978

0.0000

1.0000

Total Fees

0.6938

0.7075

-59.3419

3.7799

Turnover

0.8711

1.2987

0.0000

27.9600

Log(Total Net Assets)

5.0380

1.4451

2.9957

10.8870

Yield

0.0052

0.0137

0.0000

0.7561

0.0114

0.0647

-0.2895

0.2576

Management Type

0.6182

0.4858

0.0000

1.0000

Total Fees

0.3231

0.8731

-99.7349

2.6915

Turnover

0.8238

1.5693

0.0000

44.2400

Log(Total Net Assets)

4.7108

1.2442

2.9957

10.2102

Yield

0.0104

0.0248

0.0000

1.1008

Non-Domestic Equity
Returns (Dependent)

23585

Debt/Equity
Returns (Dependent)

16972
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Table A2: Summary Statistics Continued

Government Debt
Returns (Dependent)

Obs.
5529

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min.

Max.

0.0123

0.0286

-0.2190

0.4851

Management Type

0.1662

0.3723

0.0000

1.0000

Total Fees

0.3811

0.2777

-3.9155

1.2623

Turnover

2.2751

4.2813

0.0100

54.2400

Log(Total Net Assets)

4.7950

1.2999

2.9957

9.9261

Yield

0.0165

0.0155

0.0000

0.1179

0.0150

0.0352

-0.2922

0.4973

Management Type

0.3832

0.4862

0.0000

1.0000

Total Fees

0.4045

0.5015

-27.0670

1.5470

Turnover

2.1798

2.3382

0.0000

32.6400

Log(Total Net Assets)

4.8174

1.3603

2.9957

10.2562

Yield

0.0207

0.0182

0.0000

0.1700

0.0090

0.0336

-0.3155

0.2123

Management Type

0.1598

0.3664

0.0000

1.0000

Total Fees

0.4019

0.4095

-20.3490

0.9028

Turnover

0.4607

0.5044

0.0000

8.1500

Log(Total Net Assets)

4.7656

1.2757

2.9957

10.0158

Yield

0.0170

0.0143

0.0000

0.0759

0.0417

0.1497

-0.5400

0.5328

Management Type

0.0766

0.2661

0.0000

1.0000

Total Fees

0.7217

0.3395

-2.2215

1.7523

Turnover

1.2028

2.0169

0.0000

13.0000

Log(Total Net Assets)

4.8687

1.3642

2.9957

9.7161

Yield

0.0066

0.0157

0.0001

0.1060

Corporate Debt
Returns (Dependent)

11055

Municipal Debt
Returns (Dependent)

5704

Materials & Commodities
Returns (Dependent)

916
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Table A3: Regression Results
The following table depicts regression results for each of the seven regressions run in this study. To interpret this table, identify the Asset Class/Fund Type you
would like to study across the top row of the table. Then analyze the associated values with the independent variables and statistics in Column 1.

Independent Variables

Domestic EQ

Non-Domestic EQ

Debt/Equity

Gov. Debt

Corp. Debt

Muni. Debt

Mat./Commod.

Intercept

-0.00180**

0.00745

0.00260

0.00585

0.00931

0.00718

0.03011

Management Type

-0.00156**

-0.00565**

0.00161*

-0.00066

-0.00095

0.00098

-0.03642*

Total Fees

-0.00028

0.00260**

-0.00016

-0.00182

0.00088

0.00054

0.01449

Turnover

0.00061**

-0.00038

-0.00043

0.00013

-0.00002

0.00168

-0.00437

Log(Total Net Assets)

0.00052**

0.00028

-0.00008

0.00098**

0.00062**

-0.00009

-0.00151

SMB (Small Minus Big)

0.12857**

-0.03821**

-0.09880**

-0.06234**

-0.08035**

-0.04666**

0.18399

HML (High Minus Low)

-0.05749**

-0.05884**

0.04112**

0.01942**

0.09257**

0.06978**

-0.53372**

Rm-Rf (Risk Premium)

0.99663**

1.05877**

0.54471**

-0.05597**

0.10225**

0.07153**

1.06833**

Yield

-0.10180**

-0.05485

-0.05033**

-0.10156**

-0.14663**

-0.28922**

-0.69333**

R-Square

0.80990

0.70760

0.66140

0.06290

0.13450

0.09500

0.44700

Number of Obs.

111401

25555

19139

6425

13791

6703

927

Note: **(*) Denotes Significance at the 5 (10) percent level using a two-tailed test
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